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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 11-3844 & 11-4361 
___________ 
 
RYAN SHAFIK; ROCKWOOD STRATEGIES, LP;  
ANDREW EMERICK, 
Appellants in No. 11-4361 
 
v. 
 
JOHN F. CURRAN III, 
Appellant in No. 11-3844 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-02469) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable J. Andrew Smyser 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 26, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 26, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 2009, Ryan Shafik and his company, Rockwood Strategies, LP, (“Rockwood”) 
brought a breach of contract action against John F. Curran III.  The parties consented to 
proceed before a Magistrate Judge.  Following a bench trial, the Magistrate Judge entered 
 2 
judgment in favor of Rockwood in the amount of $28,000.  Curran appealed.
1
  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 1291.  
 Curran argues that Rockwood failed to produce relevant documents in response to 
discovery requests.  In particular, Curran complains that Rockwood did not provide a 
“precursor email . . . dated on or about October 17, 2009,” that was sent to Curran from 
Rockwood.  According to Curran, Rockwood stated in the email that it would cease to perform 
the services described in the contract if it was not paid.  Curran claimed that disclosure of this 
email “would have seriously harmed [Rockwood‟s] case had such email been produced.”   
 We review discovery matters by the abuse of discretion standard.  Public Loan Co. v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 803 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1986).  In this case, Curran submitted to 
Rockwood interrogatories and a request for production of documents.  Rockwood responded to 
those requests prior to trial.  Curran did not object to those disclosures or seek additional time 
                                              
1
 Curran mistakenly filed the notice of appeal in this Court.  In addition, the notice of appeal 
was filed more than 30 days after the Magistrate Judge entered judgment on August 17, 2011.  
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Curran attached to the notice of appeal a letter explaining that 
the “Judgment was delivered from the court to me while [I was] deployed in Iraq.”  We 
assigned the appeal No. 11-3844, forwarded the notice of appeal to the District Court for 
docketing, and directed that Curran‟s letter be treated as a “Motion for Extension of Time to 
file Notice of Appeal pursuant to [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure] 4(a)(5).”  The 
Magistrate Judge granted the Rule 4(a)(5) motion.  Although Rockwood filed a notice of 
appeal from the order granting the 4(a)(5) motion, which was docketed at No. 11-4361, see 
Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, − F.3d −, 2012 WL 3346313 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) 
(addressing appeal of order granting 4(a)(5) motion), it has since moved to voluntarily dismiss 
that appeal, stating that “it would be a waste of this Court‟s time and resources to prosecute 
[the] cross-appeal.”  See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).  We will grant Rockwood‟s motion.  
Furthermore, although Curran argued in his opening brief his notice of appeal should be 
deemed timely filed, he has since acknowledged that the issue is now moot.     
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to conduct further discovery.
2
  Consequently, he has waived any challenge to his alleged 
inability to obtain necessary discovery.  Cf. Falcone v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 805 
F.2d 115, 117 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that failure to file affidavit seeking discovery in 
summary judgment proceedings resulted in waiver of discovery claims).  Even if the issue had 
been properly preserved, we would conclude that Curran has failed to demonstrate “that there 
has been an interference with a „substantial right‟” or “a gross abuse of discretion resulting in 
fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case.”  Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 
134 (3d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).  Notably, Curran failed to comply with Rockwood‟s 
own discovery requests, see Public Loan, 803 F.2d at 87 (holding that plaintiffs‟ “lack of good 
faith in compliance with [defendants‟] discovery requests” undermined plaintiffs‟ claim that 
district court improperly denied their motion to compel discovery), and Curran has not 
explained why the allegedly exculpatory email – sent from Rockwood to Curran – was not 
already in his possession. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Magistrate Judge.
3
   
                                              
2
 Several months after trial, Curran filed a motion to compel discovery.  The District Court 
immediately entered an order striking the motion, noting that the “time for seeking discovery 
and discovery-related sanctions has passed.”  Curran did not file a notice of appeal with respect 
to that order.  To the extent that we have jurisdiction to consider the denial of Curran‟s motion 
to compel, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion 
for discovery that was first brought after a verdict was entered against Curran. 
 
3
 Rockwood‟s motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal at No. 11-3844 is granted, but its 
motion to quash Curran‟s appeal and its motion for damages pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 38 are denied.  Curran‟s “Motion for Stay of Civil Execution,” in which 
he complains, inter alia, that he has not received a copy of Rockwood‟s Brief, is denied.  We 
note that, by order entered June 28, 2012, the Clerk provided Curran with a copy of 
Rockwood‟s brief. 
